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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1\lA.RILYN l{~ ~.fANNING, )·~ 
Plain tiff and Appellant, 
.. ·- \"H .. -
I 
"\\7ESTERN AIRLINES, a eorpora- / 
tion, and CONNECTICl_P·r 
G EXER.AL LIFE INSURA)ICE ) 
(~()~f 1~ .. \!\ Y, a c-orporation, 
Defendants and Re.~pondents. 
j 
Case 
No. 9109 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMlNAI-tY STArrFJ~iJi~XT 
The Plaintiff and Appellant~ 'vido1v of one Arthur M. 
},fanning~ brought an action in the District Court of Salt 
Ijake County against the Respondents to reeover as tl1c 
beneficiary of a group insuranee policy·. The Trial Court 
summaril~y· dismiRsed A ppe] lant ~s (~ompl aint. The partiL~S 
hereinafter \viii be referred to as the}· appeared in the 
lo\ver court~ 1\..ppcllant 'viii be referred to as the Plain-
tiff and Respondents as the Defendants. 
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FACTS 
This action arises out of the death of Arthur M~ 1\fan-
ning, who was killed while working as an employee of 
the Defendant Western Airlines. The said Arthur M. 
~Ianning commenced his employment 'vith the Defendant 
Western Airlines on May 21, 1957; and on ~lay 25, 1957, 
he signed an application for group life insurancet group 
accident and sickness insurance~ and group hospital and 
surgical benefits with the family to be included and au-
thorized in wrjting deductions from his wages to pay the 
preminms thereafter. (Exhibit Dl) 
As a part of program of advising J[r. 1\-lanning of 
the group insurance plan, Defendant Western Airlines 
gave him a pamphlet which had been prepared and pub-
lishod as a joint effort on the part of the Defendants. 
(Exhibit P2) This booklet, entitled Group Insurance 
Plan, contains a schedule of the monthly benefits and 
costs to the employee. According to this schedule the total 
monthly cost of the insurance plan, including life insut'-
ance, was $11.42. The monthly deductions by the employer 
as shovvn \vere $11L70. (Exhibit D5) Apparently dednc~ 
tions were being taken on the basis of a new schedule 
which the evidence would show had never been given to 
decedent and of which he \Vas not aware. (R 42) 
The insurance that was issued was, under the Com-
pany's Group Insurance Plan, carried with the Defend-
ant Connectient General Life Insuranc-e Company~ (R. 3) 
The insurcdt Arthur M .. Manning, was killed while V.'ork-
ing near an airplane of the Defendant Western Airlines 
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on August 6, 1957, and 'vhile he was still employed with 
the said Defendant (R. 2) At the time that Arthur M. 
1\:[a nning signed up for the acceptance of the insu ranee 
program he came under a Class "'D ~' employee benefit 
authorizing the amount of $3,600400 life insurance. (R~ 3) 
In addition to the life insura.nc.o eoverage of the pol-
icy, the emp1oyce could have acc.ident,. hospitalization, 
family benefits .. (l-t4 54) At the time of his employment 
Mr. l{anning took out the group life insurance, the group 
aceident and sickness insurailce, the group hospital and 
surgir-al benefits for both himself and his family. (Ex-
b[hit Dl) 
'fhcreaftor~ the said Arthur 1\f. 1\.f anning rceeivcd no-
tinc.ation of hi8 insurance coverage, lUlder certificate No. 
8818, '\\"'tth the Plaintiff !\iari1y \·1 anning, his 'Wife, being 
named as the beneficiary thercundcr4 (1{4 2 and R. 4) 
Subsequently, in the early part of J·une, 1959, 1Ir. I\{an· 
ning inquired, in writing, about the poss[hility of drop-
ping the group life insurance part of the program and yet 
retain the other port[ons of the insurance. (Exhibit D7) 
Before doing so he disr11ssed the matter v.rith his VLrifc; 
and they decided thai because of the faet that she 'va~ 
expecting a child the areident~ sickness and hospita1 pro-
visions should be maintained. {R· 68) From tr1c early part 
of June, 1957~ unt.il his death on .A.ugu~t 6, 1957, Jir. J\Trn~-
ning never received any reply from either t.he Defendant. 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company or the De-
fendant 'Vestern Airlines4 On the 2nd day of August, 
1957., ,\~bon hfr. ~fanning brought honll~ his check covering 
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the pay period from July 15th to July 31st,. he had still 
not heard from the Company regarding his inquiry about 
the life insurance part of the insurance and discussed the 
matter with his wife, the Plaintiff herein, and dec.ide d to 
make further inquiry of the Company. (R. 68) Following 
~lr. Marming's death the Defendants refused to pay 
Plaintiff under the life insuranc.e pro\ision, claiming 11 r. 
Manning had cancelled his policy for life insurance by 
reason of Exhibit D74 
The group policy provides for the termination of the 
insurance as follows: 
"F. Insurance Data 
(a) 
(b) Termination of Insurance. If any em~ 
ployee cancels l1 is payroll deduction or~ 
der, his insurance shall cease at the end 
of the period for which the last deduc-
tion "\ova.s made~~' 
(Exhibit D9) 
Considerable discovery work was earried on between 
the parties in tl1e form of Reque:.-:1ts for Admissions and 
Interrogatories. A pre-trial "·Ms held before Judge Faux 
on tTune 5, 1959; and in its pre-trial order the (~ourt elim~ 
inated any claim for aceidcntal death benefit " 7 hieh "·ould 
automatically give an additional $3,600~00. The issue 
resolved for trial v.ra.s ,vhether or not the insurance policy 
remained in effect ( 1) because or failure to pay as re-
quired lly the terms of the plan, and ( 2) because of failure 
to complete necessary arrangements 'vhich \v<:luld entitle 
Plaintiff to recover under said plan. Pursuant to Plaina 
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tiff's ( lemand, the rna tt er \vas set down for a jury trial. 
(R~ 38) 
On J unc 22, 1959, the date set for the trial of this 
case, the parties appeared before .Judge Ellett, \vho in~ 
quired ,\·hethor or not there "'as any issue of fact to be 
submitted to the jury ..... ~t that time, as well as originally 
at pre-t1·ialt P1aintin· took the position that there ,,·as no 
issue or faet to ue tried becauRe Exhibit. D7, as a matter 
of Ia·w-~ did not eo11stitute .a cancellation of the life insur-
ance portion of the group insurance, and further because 
Defendant '~l estern ... :\irlines had deducted from deced-
ent's salary more than enough to pay the insurance pre-
miums, including life, as set forth i11 the bulletin (Exhiuit 
P2) furnished to decedent by 'V estern at the time of his 
l)eing employed .. 
In the event the Court did not sustain Plaintiff's po-
sifion in tlLis res pert., Plaintiff insi~ted on having the issue 
as to \V h ctlu.~r t.h ere had or had not been a ca n(·ella t ton of 
the insurance submitted to t1tc jury. ( lt 36) 
J udgc r~llctt, during the inquiry, stated t.hat he vrould 
like to find out \\"hat issues ,,~ere to he s uhm i tted to the 
jury a.nd a diseu~sion took plaee bct.\vepn the Court and 
cou11sel about the exhibits to be ~ubmit.t.rd. Exhibits v.rere 
then submitted. to the Court and received by the Court as 
Exhibit 1 through ] 1 ~ (ll. 77) .i\fter furtl1cr discussion 
het\veen Court. a11tl (~ounsel regarding theE.;e exhibit::; the 
Court held that ~x hi hit D-"7 sho,ved as a matter of la."\\-
that Arthur l\l. [\:1 anning had cancelled l1is insurance. An 
order was made to that effect in the absence of any motion 
l)y the ))efendants. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The Court erred in holding as a· matter of law that 
the 1ife insurance policy had been cancelled: 
(a) As ~ matter of law the policy had not been 
cancelled. 
(b) In any event whether or not there had been 
a cancellation was an issue to be submitted 
to the jury. 
---~RGU~1ENT 
I. THE COURT ER~ED IX HOLDING AS A 
MATTER OF L~-\ W THAT THE LIFE INSUR.ANCE 
POLICY HAD Bli~J{~N CANCELLED~ 
~ (a) AS A ~rArrTER OF LAW THE POLICY 
~ HAD NOT BEEN CANCELLED. 
Appellant submits that there is one basic issue to be 
decided by this appeaL ~:Phis issue rcsol ves itself a round 
the construction of Exhibit D-7 .. It is admitted by Appol~ 
!ant and all parties hereto that Exhibit D-9 constitutes 
the master insuranC-e poliey.between the Defendant West-
ern Airlines and the Connecticut General Life Insurance 
Company. It is also admitted that Mr. Arthur hi. :Man-
ning on Afay 5~ 1957, took out insurance which was covered 
by this master insurance policy by means of J1is applica- · · 
tion, Exhibit D-1. The Respondent further recognizes 
-that in Exhibit D-9 (the master insurance policy) there is 
a specific provision for the termination of the insu~ce 
coverage of an in~ividu~l employee. Paragraph F (6) 
(On th~ inside of the first cover sheet) provides : 
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"" If ar1 y employee cancels his pa:.r roll deduction 
order., his insurance shall e.easc at the end of the 
period for \Vhich the last deductiun "\VHS made. n 
There iH no argument in this matter but that .A.rthur 
l\L 'I anning continued his employment \Vj U1 the Defendn 
ant \V. (~s t.crn Airlines frou1 the date of J\Iay ~:!, 1957 t to 
. the date of his death on August 6~ 1957, and that he made 
no specific request to ha vc l ~is payroll deduction order 
cancelled. In fact, lt is appal·ent he did not intend to do 
so 11ntil he 'Yns assured by the 1\i rline Company that jt 
~~ould he done without eancclling his otl•cr insurance. 
rrhc narrow issue 'vhich the t-rial court apparently de-
cided in th[s matter is whetJ1cr or not Exhibit D-7 consti~ 
tutes a cancellation of his life insurance 'vith the \Vestern 
A irlincs under tho group policy. 
Since the Court did not rer.eivc any testimorry and 
since there was no motion made by~ the Defendants herein~ 
Appellant is in doubt as to whether or not the dismissal 
v.ras taken pursuant to Rule 41 (b), U. R. C. P. (relating to 
an involuntary dismissal) or under Rule 56 (Summary 
Judgment Y. In the event a dismissal is t a 1o~n und rr R.ule 
41 (b) :findings of fact and conclusion~ or la\\T should have 
been submitted. Admittedly no findings are necessary 
under Rule 56. For the purpose of this argument .J.l... ppel:. 
lant "\\ .. ill assume that the eourt 's action vras a summary 
judgment~ but whether t.aken as a summary judgmeJlt or 
involuntary dismissa1 the rules regarding the sufliciency 
of the gr~unds therefor are the same. 
In Exhibit D-9, 1\'hich is the master group insurance 
poliey with V\; estern Airlines and Connecticut General 
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Life Insurance Company, the provision relating to the 
termination of the insurance under Paragraph F (b) is 
as follows: 
''Termination of Insuranc.e. 
" If any employee cancels his employee ded uc-
tion order, his insurance .shall cease at the end of 
the period for which the last deduction was made.'' 
{Emphasis added) 
The deceased Arthur M. Manning never at any time 
cancelled l1is payroll deduction order (Exhibit D-1) .. The 
law is well settled that the cancellation must be made 
strictly in aceordance with the terms of the policy and 
notice of cancellation must be unconditional and absolute 
in form. 
Appleman, Insurance LauJ afld Practice~ Vol. 6, Sec. 
4193, provid e.s in part : 
~ ' 1..' he right to cancel a policy can be exercised 
only in tke mann-er provided in the policy, tmd the 
burden of proving a valid cwncellation is on the 
party asserting itt'' (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Dyche v. Bostian, Pf. al.., (Mo .. ) 233 S.W. 
2nd 721, it vras claimed that the insured attempted to can-
cel a policy with the follo\\~ing provision= 
'~This policy may be cancelled at any time by 
either of tl1c parties upon '\\'rittrn notice to the 
other party stating u~ll r.~·n ·n.ot less tham.. te·n days 
thereafttr, canceUati.on shall be effertive. The 
effective date of s11ch eancellation shall then be tllc 
end of the poliry period .. " (Emphasis added) 
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The insured \\Trote a letter on October 24 requesting 
eunrellation of the polic)~ .. The letter was received by the 
agent for the company on October 25., 19467 and he :-:;aid 
that they shouldn't. cancel the policy until they had talked 
it over. The agency again phoned the insured concern-
ing the cancellation of the policy. trhc agent tlJcn sent 
the policies to the company for cancellation on K ovem-
ber 7 .. An injury occurred on November 7, 1946, and the 
insured then raised the question of whether or not the 
insurance was in effect .. The Court l1cld tlHtt the polic-ies 
were [n force on November ·1, 1946, stating: 
''The lau' is firmly settled that, where a policy 
contains a specific provision for ca;ncellat ion by 
either party, it is binding upon the parties antd 
mu .... ';t be strictly complied with in order to tet"mi-
nate the policy .. In Home Insurance Co .. v. Ham-
ilton, 143 ~:[o. 1\_pp. 237, 128 S~\v·~ 273, 274, this 
court said : 'A contract (_~overing a ecrla 1 n period 
of time, but containing a conditional provisio11 
that it might be terminated before that time, mil 
rem a in e ff ecti ve the full term, unless the co ndi ti on 
of termination is fully complied 'vith. And this i~ 
cspcc.ialJy applicab1e to an insnrnnr.c poliey con-
taining a provision allowing a ea r1cc lla tion prior 
to the end of the term of insurance . ~ ~" 
''It is clear that the above provision .of the 
policy for eancellatlon was not followed by the 
insured~ It required that the insured give \\·ritten 
notice to the eompany and state in the notice the 
date on which cancellation was to be effective~ and 
the date so specified muK1. not be less than ten 
days from the date of the llotiec.. ...:\11 that. the 
record sho\vs is tl1 at a letter, atcom-panier.l btJ the 
pohcic,.;;;, was 'vrittert hy 1\{rs. Kelly, probably on 
October 24, 1946~ to ~-1r ... A.ltman ... the most that 
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can be said from the testimony c.onc:.crning it is that 
it requested that Mr .. Altman have the policies can~ 
celled. There 18 absolutely no sl~o,ving that it 
speeified any date of cancellation .. " (Emphasis 
added) 
The headnote in the case of blaskatchetvan Govern-
nwnt ln.'Ju·rance Office v~ Padget (1957, ( CCA 5) 24f~ F. 
2d 48, clearly states the rule of la.w as foJlovls: 
''Generally, an insurance policy is not subjc<'t 
to cancellation at the option of the insured or in-
surer except upon happening of events as specified 
in the policy~" 
As noted, the cancellation must be strictly in accord-
ance with the terms of the poliey and the terms of the 
policy require that he " ~ cancels his payroll deduction 
order .. " The decedent Arthur ~l. :\l anning never can-
celled his payroll deduction order, Exhibit' "D-1. '" 
The law is equally -clear and well settled that the 
notice of req nest for cancellation bo clear and un-
equivocal: 
'' The notice or req nest must be nncondi tional 
and absolute, and a cond·ition.al request for cancel-
l-ation is t~.()t sufficie-nt if it is not accepted by the 
company. The au.estion whether a CO"Tnn1 n·n.ication 
sho·uld or should not be constrned as a. not-l.ce of or 
request far cancellation will depend o·n the ·intent 
of th-e 1vriter or speaker as ascerta-ined from the 
whole instrument or all of i h e circu.mstmnces and 
doubts will be construe dagaimt cancellation..'' 
45 C .• J~ S.~ ''Insurance,'' Sec. 458, P~ 116-117. (Em-
phasis added} 
10 
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·rhe case most nearly analogous to the case at hand 
is ilf aq ruder v. li-n. it cd .. ~~ta-tes, ( 1929) 32 F. 2d 807. In tb is 
case the Court had t'vo issues presented to it: (1) Wheth-
er or not the insured had "caneelled'' her life insurance 
\vhile Rtill in the service and (2) \ovhcther or not the pre-
miums had l)een paid or 'vaived. 'Vhilc in the service the 
insured had authorized deductions from her pay to cover 
her \Var R-isk Insurance. TrL~asury R-egulations provided 
that the insurance would lapse and terminate upon a Vt;-rif:.. 
teu request duly 'vjtnessed for cancellation of the insur-
aucl~ and a r.orrcsponding cessation of the deductions of 
premiums from the pay of the individuaL Ilcre t.be Court 
refused to find that a war risk insurance policy had been 
cancelled \V hen the facts indica ted that the insured had 
lined out the authorization for deduction of premiums 
from disability compensation and had signed a statement 
to tllc cffr~rt that she had been explained her rights to con-
tinue her war rlsk insurance after she was separated from 
the service, "''but I do not desire to apply for a Govern-
ment insurance at this time.'' In analyzing the effect of 
this instrument the court had this to say: {P .. 810) 
"1Vhen we came tlJ consider \vhetller or not the 
statement in question contains 1 anguagc sufficient 
to convey the desire of the insured to c.anecl her 
policy~ 've are confronted with the "\vell-known 
prin ei ple that r eq u cs t for eancellation of an insur-
ance policy must be u·neq_u.-i1)ocal and absol-utf. 4 .. If 
t.he parties in tended that the statemeJlt should be 
a cancellation of the policy, they certainly made a 
failure in attempting to express that faet, \\~hert 
using the form of an 'Applic.ation for lnsuranr..e,' 
and stating that the insured did not. desire to apply 
for a government insurance at this time ... " rrhe 
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authority expressed 1n the policy to dedu-ct from 
her pay the monthly premiums was· not revoked~ 
atJJ..d to now hold, after the insured has passed on 
and n.ot here to speak~ that the statement was a 
cancellation of the policy, would be violative of 
the rule recognized by the courts that the cmnceUa-
tion of (lin -MM·uran.ce contract must be ab so lu.te and 
in clear loog1UJJ.(Ie. "~ (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Van Scoy v. NationaJ, Fire ln...'l-urance 
Compa-ny of Hartfordt Conm,ecticut, (1921) 191 Iowa 1318, 
184 N.\\T. 306, a letter was sent by the insured to the com-
pany as follo,vs: 
'"'Blcncoe!t Iowa,. June 1, 1919. 
''Dear Sirs: I want to get my polieyNo .. 467741 
c-ancelled that has just reoontly been taken out for 
tlltce years. There has been some misunderstand~ 
ing bot~reen your local agent and myself. Kindly 
inform me what is the best you can do. Yours truly 
(Signed), W .. H .. VanScoy .. " 
The Court stated (at page 307 oi 184 N.\V-.): 
"But plaintiff~s letter addressed to the com~ 
pany on ,.J uue 1, 1919, is obviously neither a re-
quest or demand for a cancellation. It does no 
n~ore than express a u:ish to hare the policy ca-nr 
celled and ask.15 to be informed of the term~ on 
\vhieh it could be accomplished. This \Vas a natural 
and proper inquiry as preliminary or preparatory 
to a cancellation in fnct, for the statute provides 
that it shall be done upon 'equitable terms' and 
g-iv(~~ to tho rr0mpany the right to exact from plain-
tiff the customary short rates of premium from 
the date of the policy to the date of cancellation.'~ 
(Emphasis added) 
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In the case of Adler v. Burnes, (1934) 288 ~!ass .. 309, 
192 )J",E. 922, the plaintiff owned some property upon 
which she had insurance.. She was about to sell the prop-
erty and desired to cancel the insurance. Her father who 
had been handling her insnranc.e matters went to the 
agent for the company, a )fr. Burnes. '' ~ ... He next 
talked with Burnes in the enrly part of July in conse-
quence of a. letter; that at that time he told Burnes not to 
bother him for the balance of the money as he intended to 
sell the property and cancel the policy because tiH~ other 
party didn't wa.n t to take them. . . .. ' ' Burnes told the 
father to try to sell the policies to the new buyers. rrhe 
trial court held there had been no cancellation. 
"'There is no evidence which would warrant a 
finding that there was any definite,. unequivocal de-
mand or request by the plaintiff or by anyone rep-
resenting her to cancel the policies. All that ap~ 
pears is that, before the sale of the property to 
)Irs. Olson, Bennett was endeavoring to persuade 
her to take over the policies, but without success .. 
Bennett did not make any definite request or de-
mand for an immediate or future ca.ncellation of 
the policies .. It is said to be a 'well-kno,vn principle 
that request for cancellation of an insurance policy 
must be unequivoeal and absolute.' ~Iagruder v .. 
United States (D .. C .. ), 32 F. (2d) 807, 810; Lyman 
Vr State 1\futual Fire Ins~ Co., 14 Allen, 329, 333; 
Clark v. Insurance Co4 of North America, 89 J\.Ie. 
26, 32, 35 .A.~ 1008, 35 L.R ... A .. 276; Davidson v. Ger-
man Ins .. Co., 74 N.J. Law, 487,65 A .. 996,13 L.R.A4 
(N.S.) 884, 12 Ann~ Cas .. 1065. See also cases in 
notes 32 C .. J ~ pp. 1259, 1260.. The conversations 
between Bennett and Burnes amounted at most to 
an expression of intention to cancel the policies at 
some time in the future." 
13 
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I 11 a s imila1· ease, the case of Phillips v. Hirschi 
(1940}, 292 l\1ich. 693,. 201 N.,V. 196 .. ~irs. Hirschi and the 
insuranc-e company lJad an exchange of correspondence 
regarding her automobile insurance~ On DecemlJer 2, 1937, 
she "\vrot.e to the company and said: '~In reply to yours of 
the 1st ~1\Till f.;ay, kindly rctul'n the money and keep your 
poI i ey4'' She then \Vent on in her Jetter to explain some 
differences that had arisen~ The trial court held that the 
poliey had bGen cancelled. Upon appeal the trial court '"-·as 
reversed. The Court said: 
""\Vhcther. the communication of Mrs. IIirsehi 
voided the agreement of protection of the insur-
ance company, depends upon the intent. of t.llc in-
sured; and sueh intent must be gleaned from the 
\v hole instrument. The words of the le1 ter ~ 'Ki rl c1-
ly return the money and koep your policy, I have 
"'Taitcd long enough for the same/ taken alone, 
'vould indicate that ~Irsa Hirschi intended the in-
surance to end. But in our opinion the letter, taken 
as a \vhole, is susceptible to a different intcr-
preta tion.'' 
_A. ppl~r ing the princi pies of the foregoing cu sr~s to the 
facts in the instant matter, it se.:ms elear that there \\-as~ 
as a matter of lav{, no caneollation of the insurance pol-
iey~ Particularl~y is this true in the light of the rule of 
lav{ that the provisions of an in~urance policy, in the rase 
of any doubtt \vill be resolved in favor of the assured or 
the beneficiary thereof. See R i.e lJ o-r ds v. .6'( l a..-n d a 1~r1 A cci-
rlf·ut J.Jv~,ura.-uf~e (~o., 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017; Gib.-~ou v. 
Equitable Lif(~ Assura ~H'f /::oc·t'rty of the flnifrd States, 
84 1J tah .::1-~;~~ 36 P ~ 2d 1 0~1. 1'he fact that this '\\.Tas a group 
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policy does not change the ru] e since this Court has hera-.-
tofore held that a group policy will be construed most 
strictly against the insurer~ Seo Bueke-r v. Equitable l.Jife 
Assurance Society of the United States, 91 Utah 179, 63 
P. 2d 604. 
(b) IN ANY ~JVENT WHETHER OR XOT 
THERE IIAD BEE~ A CANCELLATION 
WAS AN ISSUE TO BE SUBIVfiTTED TO 
THE JURY . 
. A.t the time of pre-trial no claim '\\ras made hy De-
fendants that as a matter of law they were ontitled to 
judgment. The Court framed an issue of fact over the 
objection of Plaintiff who claimed that as a matter of law 
she was entitled to judgment. The issue of fact for trial 
was as to the effect of the inquiry made by decedent in 
the follo\v-up slip4 (Exhibit D-7) This exhibit eontains 
the only statement made by the decedent to either of the 
Defendants concerning cancellation of insurance, as fol-
lows:" I ·it~sh to drop the 'life insurance' part of my pol-
icy if possible.,, (Emphasis added) 
This language in the document caused Judge Ellett 
to dismiss the Plaint~ff's Complaint. The 'vord ,; 'wish'" 
as shown hereon must be construed in the context of the 
remaining portion of the writing and can be construed as 
being precatory, that is something that he desires, not as 
a mandatory statement of something that must at all 
events be done. The usual meaning of the word is that it 
is precatory, something desired. (Sec H1 ords and Phrases;~ 
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VoL 45, pp. 359-360 .. See also 1959 Annual Accumulative 
Pocket Part, p. 113.) 
Like,vise, the \VOrds ''if possible'' rJave been con-
strued by the c.ourt and particularly in the rn~e of Br(n.V11-
v. B-ishop, 105 fi.'f e. 272, 74 Atl. 724, 729 as follo\VS: 
''The lexical meaning of the ~"'ord 'possible' 
is 'capable of heing done; not contrary to the na-
ture of things.~ .rrhe condition of th i o contract, as 
expres~erl in tl1e ¥t,.ords 'if possible,' is to be inter-
preted \\··j1.h reference to the thing to he done, the 
cutting and removing of the trees a~ timber. n 
Courts 8hould only grant Summary Judgment where 
the facts are clear and unequivocal. ll. R. C .. P. 56 (e) pro-
vides in part as follo"\vs : 
~'.. .. . The judgment sought sl1a 11 he rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositioTls, and ad-
mis~dons on IDe~ together with the affidavits:r if any, 
sho\v that there is no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact and that the moving party ig entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law .... " 
P rofcssor rd oore in l1 1 s trea ti.se on tlH.~ li"lcd r~r.al R.ules 
of Civil Procedure has this comment on this particular 
rule: 
"The function of the summaty judgment is to 
avoid a useless trial j and a. trial is not only not 
u.~eless {sic) but absolutely nr:cessary "~here there 
is a genuine issue as to any material faf·t. ln. rul-
i·n..lf nn- a Jnotio-u for ,.;;;JunnnlrlJ }udgn1e·nt the court's 
{tnu·tio-n ·is to det('r}n int~ u·1Jethe r such a ,acnn·i·ne 
is.~ue c:ri .... ·J S 7 not to rrsoll'r. any factual -isf:!.ues. '~ 
( )l on re 's F•ederal Practice, Vol. 6, p. ~101) (Em-
phasis added) 
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'nrhe courts are in entire agreement that the 
moving party for smnmary judgment has the bur-
den of sho\ving the absence of any genuine issue as 
to all the material facts, which, under applicable 
princi pies of substantive la '"'T' entitle him to j udg-
ment as a matter of law. The courtS" hold the 
mo-vant to a strict sta·n.dard .. To ~'tatisfy h-is burden 
the movant must make a showing tha-t is quite Glear 
what lhe truth 'is, and that excludes any real doubt 
a.s to the ex.isten ce of any genuine issu-e of material 
fact. Since it. is not the function of the trial court 
to adjudicate genuine factual issues at the hearing 
on the motion for summary judgment, in ruling on 
the motio11 aJl infrrence.s of fact from the proofs 
proffe-red at the hea.r-ing mu~~t be be drawn against 
the tnoveldtt and in fat)or of the party opposing the 
-;no f iou. And the pa pcrs supporting movant ~s po-
sition are closely scrutinized~ while the opposing 
papers are indulgently treated, in determining 
whether the movant has satisfied his burden. 
''To satisfy the moving party's burden the evi-
dentiary material before the court, jf taken as true, 
must cstab1ish the absenee of any genuine issue 
of material fact, and it must appear that there is 
no real question as to the credibility of the evi-
dentiary material, so that it is to he taken as true. 
If the nonexit-Jt.e-rlee of any genuine issue of mate-
rial fact is established by such credible evidence 
that on the facts and the la\v the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the motion should 
he granted, uules8 the opposing party sl1ow~ good 
reason "'·hy he is at the time of the hearing unable 
to present facts in opposition to the mot.ion. If, 
hov~rever, the papers before the coutt disclose a 
real i~sue of credibility or, apart from credibility, 
fail to establish clearly that there i ~ no genuine 
issue as to anv material fact, the motion must be 
denied .. ' ' C~.f~ore 's Federal Practice~ VoL 6~ pp. 
2133-2126) (Emphasis added) 
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The evidence must be clear and uncquivoeal in order 
to support a Summary Judgment, see l~ ou..ng v. Felornia 
( 1952) 121 r; tab 646, 244 P. 2d 862 ( Cert. denied 344 U. S .. 
885); Ulibarri v. Ghriste1tson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P .. 2d 
170 ; Fountain v. Filson ( 1949) 336 U. S. 681, 61 S. Ct. 754, 
'93 IJ. Ed .. 971; II olbrook et ux v" Webster's Inc. et al, 
(1958) ·7 Utah 2d 148, 320, P~ 2d 661. 
Tho rule of law as to reviev{ of a summary judgment 
is clearly stated in Federal Practice and Procedure, by 
Barren and IIoltzoff, VoL 3~ p. 120, as follows: 
''On appeal from a summary judgment, the 
Court appeals should view the facts from a stand-
point most favorable to the appellant and accept 
his allegations of fact as true, and assume a state 
of facts most favorable to him~ On appeal from a 
summary judgment, the only question is \\~het-her 
the allegations of the party against 'vhom it 'vas 
rendered were sufficient to raise a material or 
genuine issue of fact." 
In this case the only e~idence then, upon which the 
Court relied ir1 makir1g its determination is }3xhihit D-7 
and in particular the part that states 0 I wish to drop the 
~life insurance' part of my policy if possible~ Thank you .. 
/s/ Arthur 1\f. ~fanning.'' (Emphasis added) 
The trial court then refused to permit any other eYi-
dence to be entered to sl10\v \Yhat the intent of the deced-
ent may have been, tou(']nding thnt thi5i Exhibit D-7 ·was 
an unequivocal can{~r.llnt ion of the insurance policy R--75. 
In so deciding the Court staterl: 
":&.fay be if I am in error the Supreme Court at 
your instance and request - T am sure you will 
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take this matter there ~ will tell me that this is 
a jury question and the jury must determine that, 
but I think that is an unequivocal document, that 
it cancelled his insurance, and when they ceased to 
deduct the thirteen fifty from him, he knew, had 
notice that they had accepted that, and therefore 
there would be no jury questiont The complaint of 
the pia in tiff Vt~ill be dismissed. ' ' 
We respectfully submit that under the law as cited 
the court should hold as a matter of law that the life insur-
ance had not been cancelled since there must be a strict 
compliance with the terms of the policy and Mr. Manning 
never gave any cancellation of his deduction order. In 
any event, the Exhibit D-7 is sufficiently ambiguous that 
it is a jury question and the issue should have been sub-
mitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the insurance 
policy has a strict provision by which the insurance could 
be cancelled and terminated. That this provision was 
not followed and all of the presumptions of law favor the 
position that the p oliey sha 11 be construed roost strictly 
against the insurer and that the issue of whether or not 
there was a cancellation must be one which is clear and 
unequivocal in its nature and we respectfully submit t.hat 
such is not the case here and thnt the matter should have 
been submitted to the jury. 
ARrrHUR H4 NIELSEN 
DEAN E. CONDER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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